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A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: A Liberal
Communitarian Approach
AMITAI ETZIONI*
A privacy doctrine built for the cyber age must address a radical
change in the type and scale of violations that the nation-and the
world-face, namely that the greatest current threats to privacy come
not at the point that personal information is collected, but rather from
the secondary uses of such information. Often cited court cases, such
as Katz, Berger, Smith, Karo, Knotts, Kyllo-and most recently
Jones-concern whether or not the initial collection of information
was in compliance with the Constitution. They do not address the fact
that personal information that was legally obtained may nevertheless
be used later to violate privacy-that the ways such information is
stored, collated with other pieces of information, analyzed, and
distributed or accessed-often entails very significant violations of
privacy.1 Moreover, although a considerable number of laws and court
cases cover these secondary usages of information, they do not come
together to make a coherent doctrine of privacy-and most assuredly
not one that addresses the unique challenges of the cyber age.2
* University Professor and Professor of International Affairs at The George Washington
University. I previously served as a Senior Advisor at the Carter White House; taught at
Columbia University, Harvard, and the University of California at Berkeley; and served as
the President of the American Sociological Association. I am the author of numerous
books, including The Limits of Privacy and, most recently, Hot Spots. I am indebted to
Ashley MeKinless for extensive research assistance on this article, and to Alex Platt, Steven
Bellovin, Shaun Spencer, and Marc Blitz for comments on a previous draft.
lAmitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: WhatIs To Be Done?, 14 PENN. J. CONST. L. 929
(Mar. 2012).
2 Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904,912 (2002) ("[t]he
increasing storage of telephone calls is part of the much broader expansion since 1967 of
stored records in the hands of third parties. Although there are no Supreme Court cases on
most of these categories of stored records, the Miller and Smith line of cases make it quite
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True, collected personal information was subject to secondary
abuses even when it was largely paperbound (e.g., in police blotters or
FBI files). Indeed, when Warren and Brandeis published their
groundbreaking 189o article in the Harvard Law Review, considered
the "genesis of the right of privacy," they were not concerned about
gossip per se (a first order privacy violation) but about the wider
distribution of intimate details through the media (a secondary
violation).3 However, the digitization of information, the widespread
use of the Internet and computers, and the introduction of artificial
intelligence systems to analyze vast amounts of data have increased
the extent, volume, scope, and kinds of secondary usages by so many
orders of magnitude that it is difficult to find a proper expression to
capture the import of this transformation.4 The main point is not that
information can now be processed at a tiny fraction of the cost and
incomparably faster speeds than when it was paper bound, which is
certainly the case, but that modes of analysis-which divine new
personal information out of personal data previously collected-that
are common today were simply inconceivable when most personal
information was paper bound.5 Because these observations are critical
to all that follows, and because the term "secondary usages" (which
implies usages less important than the first or primary ones) is a
possible that the government can take all of these records without navigating Fourth
Amendment protections."). Some scholars have suggested that Fourth Amendment
restrictions should apply to subsequent use, although the analysis is not sufficiently
developed in the courts to constitute a meaningful privacy doctrine. Harold J. Krent, Of
Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REV.
49, 51 (1995) ("[i]f the state can obtain the information only through means constituting a
search or seizure, then use restrictions should apply, confining the governmental
authorities to uses consistent with the [Fourth] Amendment's reasonableness
requirement").
3 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right ofPrivacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
4 For an excellent overview of how advances in information and communication
technologies have rendered obsolete the privacy laws (and the doctrines on which these
laws are based) of the 198os and 199os see Omer Tene, Privacy: The new generations, 1
INT' DATA PRIVACY L. 15 (2011). For a discussion of how these changes have particularly
affected the privacy expectations of the 'Facebook generation' see Mary Graw Leary,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MiSS. L.J. 1033 (2011).
5 This is of course not a terribly new position-legal scholars have been discussing the
implications for privacy and the Fourth Amendment of the Internet since its introduction
as publically available technology. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 222-23 (1999) and Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace,
Keynote Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom, & Privacy (Mar. 26,
1991), available at http://www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html.
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rather weak one, I employ from here on the term cybernation to refer
to information that is digitized, stored, processed, and formatted for
mass distribution. Cybernated data can be employed in two distinct
ways, and both represent a serious and growing threat to privacy. A
discrete piece of personal information, collected at one point in time
("spot" information) may be used for some purpose other than that for
which it was originally deemed constitutional, or spot information
may be pieced together with other data to generate new information
about the person's most inner and intimate life.
The cyber age privacy doctrine must lay down the foundations on
which Congress can develop laws and the courts can accumulate cases
that will determine not merely what information the government may
legally collect-but also what it might do with that data. According to
some legal scholars, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Maynard and the
concurring opinion by the Supreme Court's justices in Jones provide
the building blocks for this new edifice, sometimes referred to as a
mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment, under which "individual
actions of law enforcement that are not searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes may become searches when taken together en
masse."6 This observation is based on Justice Alito's argument that the
GPS tracking of a vehicle on a public highway constituted a search
because of the length of time over which the monitoring took place
(twenty-eight days). This opens the door to taking into account the
volume of information collected, and presumes that, while limited
amounts of collection may be permissible, large amounts could
constitute a violation of privacy. Jones, however, still only deals with
collection. Hence, most of the work of laying down the foundations for
the protection of privacy from cybernation remains to be carried out.
This article first suggests that we cannot rely on the privacy
expectations of individuals or society-principles introduced in Katz-
in developing a new privacy doctrine for the cyber age (Part I, A). This
article then briefly indicates that a return to the home as the major
focus of privacy will not serve either, and that we are to consider
privacy as a protective sphere that follows the individual regardless of
6 Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy
Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 737, 738 (2012). See also Orin Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, III MICH. L. REv. 311,320 (2012) ("[u]nder
mosaic theory, searches can be defined collectively as a sequence of discrete steps rather
than as individualized steps. Identifying Fourth Amendment search requires analyzing
police actions over time as a collective 'mosaic' of surveillance."); Madelaine Virgina Ford,
Mosaic Theory and the Fourth Amendment: How Jones Can Save Privacy in the Face of
Evolving Technology, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1351,1353 (2011); Bethany L.
Dickman, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United
States v. Maryland 6o AM. U. L. REv. 731 (2011).
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place (Part I, B). This article then introduces a "social policy model" of
the Fourth Amendment to move us forward.7 Within this model, we
shall see that defining what is minimally intrusive becomes a key
issue; instead of treating intrusiveness as a discrete variable, we find it
must be treated as a continuous one. That is, the intrusiveness of an
act may be considered higher or lower rather than either minimal or
not (Part I, C).
Having cleared the way through these deliberations, this article
outlines the three dimensions of a cyber age privacy cube: volume,
sensitivity, and cybernation (Part II). The last section of this article
deals with the issue of defining when the collection and cybernation of
information along these dimensions violates privacy (Part III).
PART I. ASSUMPTIONS
A. Moving Beyond Katz
Since 1967, the U.S. legal system has drawn on the twin concepts
of personal and societal expectations of privacy to determine whether
a Fourth Amendment "search" has taken place. This article assumes
that relying on both or either expectations of privacy, as articulated by
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz, is indefensible and
that it should be allowed to fade from legal practice. Indeed, Justice
Harlan himself adopted rather quickly a critical view of his two-
pronged test. Four years after Katz, in his dissent for U.S. v. White,
Harlan wrote, "[w]hile these formulations represent an advance over
the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law, they too
have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of
words for analysis. The analysis must, in my view, transcend the
search for subjective expectations."8
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard has since faced a
range of strong criticisms.9 In his widely cited article on the Fourth
Amendment, Anthony G. Amsterdam writes:
7 Orin S. Kerr, FourModels of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,519
(2007).
8 U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971).
9 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 843 (2002); Jim Harper, Reforming the Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57
AM. U. L. REv. 5 (2008); Haley Plourde-Cole, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in the Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (2010); Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society, 42 DuKE L.J. 727 (1993); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining The 'Reasonable
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An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously
has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a
theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can
neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an
individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it
could, the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectations of privacy merely by
announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced by a decade and that we were all
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance . . . .Fortunately, neither Katz nor the
fourth amendment asks what we expect of government.
They tell us what we should demand of government. 10
A leading scholar of the Fourth Amendment and privacy, Orin
Kerr, concedes, "[w]hat counts as a 'reasonable expectation of privacy'
is very much up for grabs,"1 and much respected students of privacy
Charles Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin charge that the
Supreme Court has sent "mixed signals" on how to apply this
standard.12
The absurdity of Katz is revealed by contemplating the following
example: Assume a municipal government announces that, for public
health reasons, anyone who relieves themselves in a public pool would
be charged with a misdemeanor. This government would then insert a
dye (which unfortunately only exists in Hollywood's fertile
imagination) that would form a dark blue cloud around anyone who
violates the ordinance, but would not announce the introduction of
this dye. By Katz, surely a person could argue that their expectation of
privacy has been grossly violated, as they did not expect to be detected
when peeing in the pool. Would it be therefore reasonable to rule this
ordinance unconstitutional and to dismiss the charges against them?
Expectation Of Privacy': An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1108
(1987); Sherry F. Colb, What Is A Search? Two Conceptual Flaws In Fourth Amendment
Doctrine And Some Hints OfA Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002); Silas
Wasserstom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory,
77 GEO. L.J. 19 (1988).
10 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
383 (1974).
11 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801,808 (2004).
12 CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS
OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 116 (3d ed. 1993).
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And once the introduction of the dye is made public, how many people
would have to know about it before it is no longer reasonable to expect
privacy in the matter? And who determines what is a reasonable
expectation, and how? Would one announcement about the new dye
suffice, or must it be regularly advertised?
Or, take those who speak in a sizeable political meeting. They may
well have no expectation of privacy. However, surely they should be
protected from government surveillance in such a setting under most
circumstances, to protect their privacy (among other reasons).13 And
do new technologies change what is expected, with, say, Facebook
lowering the standards of privacy because so many people post so
much private information? The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) only protects emails for ninety days, during which time a
warrant is needed for the government to read them. After that, a
subpoena from any prosecutor will do, without judicial oversight,
because in 1986 the thought of keeping emails around that long was
ridiculous because the cost of storing them was so high. Does anyone
expect that their emails are private (to the extent that they are) for
ninety days but not for more?
As to the societal expectation of privacy, a sociologist is keen to
know which, if any, communities will be polled to establish what this
expectation is.14 Is it the privacy expected by the community of which
the defendant is a member-say Spanish Harlem? Or is it the city of
New York, or the United States, or the judge's country club? The fact
that judges are free to assume they can rely on their sociological
instincts as to what the community expects seems a strange
foundation to rely on to determine when a search violates the
Constitution.15
13 Further, what is considered a reasonable expectation is in constant flux due to
technological changes. Thus, as the use of the Internet for personal communications grew,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 failed to protect stored private emails
because it was passed in a time when most emails were related to business records, which
are expected to be afforded a lesser degree of privacy. See Deirdre L. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557 (2004).
14 Slobogin and Schumacher, supra note 9, at 732 ("a sense of how [innocent] U.S. citizens
gauge the impact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly
relevant to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This article describes an effort to
obtain some preliminary data in this regard.").
15 ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 (2003) ("[b]ecause there is
no straightforward answer to this question, 'reasonable' has largely come to mean what a
majority of the Supreme Court Justices say is reasonable").
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Finally, the whole notion is circular. Mr. Katz-and all others-
either has or does not have an expectation of privacy depending on
what the Supreme Court rules. Jim Harper put it well when he wrote:
"Societal expectations are guided by judicial rulings, which are
supposedly guided by societal expectations, which in turn are guided
by judicial rulings, and so on."16
Four years after the Supreme Court ruled that the police had
violated Katz's Fourth Amendment rights by bugging a public pay
phone without a warrant, the Court held in United States v. White that
no warrant was needed to record a conversation in a private home!17 A
reasonable person would expect that Mr. White has a higher
expectation of privacy in his home than Mr. Katz has in a public phone
booth. Nor is there any reason to believe that "society" found the
government's surveillance to be more reasonable in White's home
then in the public booth.
Particularly relevant to what follows is that various court cases
that draw on Katz seem not to recognize what might be called a "split
condition"-that is, situations in which the government collects
information in a way that would be considered constitutional because
it was "expected," but then uses and distributes it in "unexpected"
ways, which would, thus, be in violation of the Constitution. There are,
of course, many such split situations, and these situations should be
covered by any comprehensive theory of privacy.
In short, it is difficult for a reasonable person to make sense out of
Katz. Court rulings on whether a collection of personal information is
a "search" by Justice Harlan's formula seem to be highly dependent on
what judges think a person or "society" would expect without
determining in any half-objective way what these expectations
actually are. And, at the same time, such standards ignore that rulings
on privacy recast these expectations. It may take a long time before
Katz is repealed. Meanwhile more reasonable criteria for privacy need
to be developed and used to in effect replace Katz.
16 Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrines, 57 AM. U. L. REV.1381,
1392 (2008); See also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 60 (2001) ("Harlan's test wasapplauded as a victory for privacy, but it
soon became clear that it was entirely circular"); Michael Abramowics, Constitutional
Cicularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 ("Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular,
for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court
has held that a search in that area would be unreasonable").
17A. Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court,
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS L.J. 5 (2002).
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B. But Not Back to 'The Castle'
To suggest that the time has come to leave behind the reasonable
of privacy expectation standard, this is not to say that the courts
should revert to pre-Katz Fourth Amendment analysis, which gave
considerable weight to the home as the locus of privacy. In Katz the
majority ruled "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
rejecting the "trespass" doctrine enunciated in Olmstead.1 However,
even after this, the home remained largely inviolable in the eyes of the
courts. It seems Katz did not detach Fourth Amendment safeguards
from the home but rather extended the sphere of privacy beyond it to
other protected spaces. Information collected about events in one's
home is still often considered a priori a violation of privacy, while
much more license is granted to the state in collecting information
about conduct in public and commercial spaces. As Justice Scalia put
it, "'[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.' With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no."19 This is an idea that has deep roots in
American and English common law: "Zealous and frequent repetition
of the adage that a 'man's house is his castle,' made it abundantly clear
that both in England and the Colonies 'the freedom of one's house'
was one of the most vital elements of English liberty."2o In Dow
Chemical Company v. United States, the Court established that the
expectation of privacy was lower in an industrial plant than a home
because the latter "is fundamentally a sanctuary, where personal
concepts of self and family are forged, where relationships are
nurtured and where people normally feel free to express themselves in
intimate ways. ''21
Feminist scholars correctly roundly criticized the inviolability of
the home and the private/public distinction in privacy law. Catharine
MacKinnon writes the problem with granting the home extra
protection is that "while the private has been a refuge for some, it has
18 Id. at 20 (discussing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
19 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
20 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591-98 (198o).
21749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984), affd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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been a hellhole for others, often at the same time."22 Linda McClain
points out that freedom from state interference in the home "renders
men unaccountable for what is done in private-rape, battery, and
other exploitation."23
Moreover, this article draws on the findings that the
private/public distinction is rapidly declining in importance in
general24 and with regard to privacy in particular.25 Marc Jonathon
Blitz made the case compelling with regard to the cyber age and hence
is quoted here at some length:
The 1969 case Stanley v. Georgia forbade the
government from restricting the books that an
individual may read or the films he may watch "in the
privacy of his own home." Since that time, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Stanley's
protection applies solely within the physical boundaries
of the home: While obscene books or films are
protected inside of the home, they are not protected en
route to it-whether in a package sent by mail, in a
suitcase one is carrying to one's house, or in a stream of
data obtained through the Internet.
However adequate this narrow reading of Stanley may
have been in the four decades since the case was
decided, it is ill-suited to the twenty-first century,
where the in-home cultural life protected by the Court
in Stanley inevitably spills over into, or connects with,
electronic realms beyond it. Individuals increasingly
watch films not, as the defendant in Stanley did, by
bringing an eight millimeter film or other physical copy
22 Catharine A. MaeKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1311 (1991).
23 Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 209 (1995).
24 Amitai Etzioni, The Bankruptcy of Liberalism and Conservatism, 128 PSQ 39 (2013).
25 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places And The
Right to Anonymity, 72 MIss. L.J. 213 (2002). Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1751, 1758-59 (Oct. 1994), Bethany L. Dickman, Untying Knotts: The Application of
Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. Maryland 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731
(2011).
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of the film into their house, but by streaming it through
the Internet. Especially as eReaders, such as the
Kindle, and tablets, such as the iPad, proliferate,
individuals read books by downloading digital copies of
them. They store their own artistic and written work
not in a desk drawer or in a safe, but in the "cloud" of
data storage offered to them on far-away servers.26
Privacy, it follows, is hence best viewed as a personal sphere that
follows an individual irrespective of location. This is a version of what
Christopher Slobogin refers to as the protection-of-personhood theory
of privacy, which "views the right to privacy as a means of ensuring
individuals are free to define themselves."27 Privacy plays the same
role whether one is in the home or out in public: "Because a
substantial part of our personality is developed in public venues,
through rituals of our daily lives that occur outside the home and
outside the family, cameras that stultify public conduct can stifle
personality development."2 If the government uses a long distance
"shotgun mic" to eavesdrop on the conversations of two persons
walking in a public park, such a search is clearly more intrusive than if
the government measured the heat setting in their kitchen. This is the
case because conversations are much more revealing about the
person, including their medical condition, political views, and so on,
than their preferred heat setting.29 In short, privacy is best not home
bound but person centered.
C. A 'Social Policy 'Model of the Fourth Amendment
The cyber age privacy doctrine concerns the normative principles
that underlie both the evolving interpretations of the Constitution and
the laws enacted by Congress, reflecting changes in the moral culture
of the society. It hence deals both with the Fourth Amendment and
public policy. Such normative comprehensive changes have occurred
in other areas. For instance, the civil rights movement has led to
changes in the position of the Supreme Court (e.g., from Plessy v.
26 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (2010).
27 Slobogin, supra note 25, at 254.
28 Id. at 255.
291 discuss below the question of whether information that reveals that one is committing a
crime deserves extra protection. See infra, Part II.A.
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Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education) and-to acts of Congress
(e.g., the Voting Rights Act of 1965). More recently, changes were
introduced both by the courts and by various legislatures reflecting
changes in the characterization of same sex marriage in the moral
culture. Now such a change is called for with regard to the concept of
privacy. This article next discusses the normative principles of such a
reconstituted concept.
(i) In seeking to base a privacy doctrine neither on expectations
of privacy nor on location, this article draws on a liberal
communitarian philosophy that assumes that individual rights, such
as the right to privacy, must be balanced with concerns for the
common good, such as those about public health and national
security.3o (By contrast, authoritarian and East Asian communitarians
tend to be exclusively concerned with the common good or pay mind
to rights only to the extent that they serve the rulers' aims.31 At the
opposite end of the spectrum, libertarians and several contemporary
liberals privilege individual rights and autonomy over societal
formulations of the common good.) Although the term "common
good" is not one often found in legal literature, its referent is rather
close to what is meant by "public interest," which courts frequently
recognize, and a similar concept is found in the U.S. Constitution's
reference to the quest for a "more perfect union."
The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."32 This is a
prime example of a liberal communitarian text because it does not
employ the absolute, rights-focused language of many other
amendments (e.g., "Congress shall make no law"), but recognizes on
the face of it that there are reasonable searches, understood as those
in which a compelling public interest takes precedence over personal
privacy.
(ii) This article assumes that the communitarian balance is meta-
stable. That is, for societies to maintain a sound communitarian
regime-a careful balance between individual rights and the common
good-societies must constantly adjust their public policies and laws
in response to changing external circumstances (e.g., 9/11) and
internal developments (e.g., FBI overreach). Moreover, given that
societal steering mechanisms are rather loose, societies tend to over-
steer and must correct their corrections with still further adjustments.
3o Amitai Etzioni, Community, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (forthcoming 2015).
31 Id.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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For example, in the mid-197os, the Church and Pike Committees
investigated abuses by the CIA, FBI and NSA, uncovering "domestic
spying on Americans, harassment and disruption of targeted
individuals and groups, assassination plots targeting foreign leaders,
infiltration, and manipulation of media and business."33 As a result,
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA) and created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to limit
the surveillance of American citizens by the U.S. government. 34 After
9/11, several reports concluded that the reforms had gone too far by
blocking the type of interagency intelligence sharing that could have
forestalled the terrorist attacks.35 As a result, the Patriot Act was
enacted in a great rush and, according to its critics, sacrificed privacy
excessively in order to enhance security and "correct" what are
considered the excesses of the reforms the Church and Pike
committees set into motion. Since then, the Patriot Act itself has been
recalibrated.36
At each point in time, one must hence ask whether society is tilting
too far in one direction or the other. Civil libertarians tend to hold that
rights in general and privacy in particular are not adequately
protected. The government tends to hold that national security and
public safety require additional limitations on privacy. It is the
mission of legal scholars, public intellectuals, and concerned citizens
to nurture dialogues that help sort out in which direction corrections
must next be made.37 Note that often some tightening in one area
33 Post-Watergate Intelligence Investigations, MARY FERRELL FOUNDATION,
http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.php/Post-Watergate-Intelligence-Investigations
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
34 Id.
35 Thomas B. Hunter, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing, OPERATIONAL STUDIES 3
(Dec. 2004).
36 For a critical analysis of the "Information Sharing Paradigm" that has arisen in law
enforcement and intelligence community since 9/11, see Peter P. Swire, Privacy and
Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VIL. L. REV. 951 (2OO6).
37 Alexander Aleinikoff, writing in 1987, argued that the courts had entered the "age of
balancing." "Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for weakening earlier categorical
doctrines restricting governmental power to search and seize." T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,965 (1987). Many civil
libertarians have argued that post-9/11, Fourth Amendment rights are being systematically
eroded in the name of national security. See Jay Stanley, Reviving the Fourth Amendment
and American Privacy, ACLU (May 28, 20o), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security-technology-and-liberty/reviving-fourth-amendment- and- american-privacy. See
also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REv. 476, 478 (2011) ("[t]he theory of equilibrium-adjustment posits that the
Supreme Court adjusts the scope of Fourth Amendment protection in response to new facts
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ought to be combined with some easing in others. For instance,
currently a case can be made that Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) screening regulations are too tight, while the
monitoring of whether visitors and temporary residents committed to
leaving the U.S. actually do so is too loose.
Orin Kerr and Peter Swire engage in an important dialogue on
whether the issues presented above are best suited for treatment by
the courts or by Congress, and whether they are largely viewed
through the prism of the Fourth Amendment or congressional acts.
The following discussion treats both as if they were an amalgam.
(iii) Four criteria help specify the liberal communitarian approach
to privacy.38 First, a liberal democratic government will limit privacy
only if it faces a well documented and large-scale threat to the
common good (such as to public safety or public health), not merely a
hypothetical threat or one limited to few individuals or localities (I
avoid the term "clear and present danger," despite the similarity in
meaning, because it has a specific legal reference not here intended).
The main reason this threshold must be cleared is because modifying
legal precepts-and with them the ethical, social, public philosophies
that underlie them-endangers their legitimacy. Changes, therefore,
should not be undertaken unless there is strong evidence that either
the common good or privacy has been significantly undermined.
Second, if the finding is that the common good needs shoring up,
one had best seek to establish whether this goal can be achieved
without introducing new limits on privacy. For instance, this is
achieved by removing personally identifying information (such as
names, addresses and social security numbers) when medical records
are needed by researchers, thus allowing access to data previously not
accessible. True, various technical difficulties arise in securing the
anonymity of the data. Several ingenious suggestions have been made
to cope with this challenge.39 Conversely, if privacy needs shoring up,
one should look for ways to proceed that impose no "losses" to the
common good, such as introducing audit trails.
Third, to the extent that privacy-curbing measures must be
introduced, they should be asunintrusive as possible. For example,
many agree that drug tests should be conducted on those directly
in order to restore the status quo level of protection. When changing technology or social
practice expands government power, the Supreme Court tightens Fourth Amendment
protection; when it threatens government power, the Supreme Court loosens constitutional
protection.).
38 See Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 5 (1999).
39 See infra note 78.
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responsible for the lives of others, such as school bus drivers. Some
employers, however, resort to highly intrusive visual surveillance to
ensure that the sample is taken from the person who delivers it.
Instead, one can rely on the much less intrusive procedure of
measuring the temperature of the sample immediately following
delivery.
Fourth, measures that ameliorate the undesirable side effects of
necessary privacy-diminishing measures are to be preferred over
those that ignore these effects. Thus, if contact tracing is deemed
necessary to curb the spread of infectious diseases to protect public
health, efforts must be made to protect the anonymity of those
involved. A third party may inform those who were in contact with an
affected individual about such exposure and the therapeutic and
protective measures they ought to next undertake, without disclosing
the identity of the diagnosed person.
The combined application of these four balancing criteria helps to
determine which correctives to a society's course are both needed and
not excessive. This article focuses on the third criteria and seeks to
address the question: What is least intrusive?
PART II. PRIVACY AS A THREE DIMENSIONAL CUBE
In this section I attempt to show that to maintain privacy in the
cyber age, boundaries on information that may be used by the
government should be considered along three major dimensions: The
level of sensitivity of the information, the volume of information
collected, and the extent of cybernation. These considerations guide
one to find the lowest level of intrusiveness holding constant the level
of common good. A society ought to tolerate more intrusiveness if
there are valid reasons to hold that the threat to the public has
significantly increased (e.g., there is an outbreak of a pandemic), and
reassert a lower level of intrusiveness when such a threat has
subsided.
A. Sensitivity
One dimension is the level of sensitivity of the information.4o For
instance, data about a person's medical condition is considered highly
sensitive, as is information about one's political beliefs and conduct
4o AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3 RD EDITION: LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS STANDARDS (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice-standards
/third party-access.authcheekdam.pdf.
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(e.g., voting) and personal thoughts. Financial information is ranked
as less sensitive than medical information, with publically presented
information (e.g., license plates) and routine consumer choices even
less so.
These rankings are not based on "expectations of privacy" or on
what this or that judge divines as societal expectations.41 Rather, they
reflect shared social values and are the product of politics in the good
sense of the term, of liberal democratic processes, and of moral
dialogues.42 Different nations may rank differently what they consider
sensitive. For example, France strongly restricts the collection of
information by the government about race, ethnicity, and religion
(although its rationale is not the protection of privacy but rather a
strong assimilationist policy and separation of the state and church).
For those who analyze the law in terms of the law and economics
paradigm, disclosure of sensitive data causes more harm to the person
by objective standards than does the disclosure of data that is not
sensitive. Thus, disclosure of one's medical condition may lead one to
lose one's job or not be hired, to be unable obtain a loan, or to incur
higher insurance costs, among other harms. By contrast, disclosure of
the kinds of bread, cheese, or sheets one buys may affect mainly the
kind and amount of spam one receives.
A re-examination of Kyllo helps highlight this principle. If one
goes by Katz, the legality of a thermal imaging search from outside the
home depends on what one presumes personal and societal
expectations to be. At least in middle class American suburbs, people
may consider such a heat reading a violation of their expectations. If
one clings to the idea that "my home is my castle," measuring the heat
inside the home is indeed a major violation of privacy. However, if one
goes by the cyber age privacy doctrine here outlined, such readings
rank very low on sensitivity because they reveal very little or nothing
about the resident's medical, financial, or political preferences, let
alone their thoughts. And they detect an extremely low bandwidth of
information. The information revealed is less consequential than what
kind of cereal or which brand of coffee the person purchased. In
41 Shaun Spencer raises concerns around legislating privacy protections. See Spencer,
supra note 9, at 86o ("[g]iven the powerful influence of various lobbies opposed to strong
privacy protection, that role may best be described as a sine qua non. That is, unless the
public has a strong desire for privacy in a particular area, attempts to pass legislation
establishing that area as a private sphere are doomed to fail... To the extent that
legislatures base privacy legislation on social values and norms, they necessarily rely on the
same changing expectations as the judicial conception of privacy").
42 AMITAi ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY: A NEw APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 67-71 (2004).
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contrast, taping a person's phone calls is much more revealing. Hence
both Kyllo and White deserve to be reversed.
One may argue that information about the heat inside a home is
actually particularly sensitive because it reveals that a crime is being
committed. Preventing crime is obviously a contribution to the
common good. And given that in 2011 fewer than half of violent
crimes and twenty percent of property crimes in the U.S. were
resolved, some may well hold that public authorities are not
excessively indulged when dealing with crime.43 As to harm to the
rights of the individuals involved, they would be harmed only if they
had a right to commit a crime. As to the presumption of innocence,
there is the public safety exception. The arguments against the notion
that crime committed in a home (e.g., spousal abuse) deserves more
protection than one committed in public were already presented
above. What is new here is that historically, when the Constitution
was written, searching a home required a person to enter or peep,
which would entail a high level of intrusiveness because the intruder
could not but note other potentially sensitive information besides
whether or not a crime was being committed. However, technologies
that have a very narrow and crime-specific bandwidth (e.g., dogs that
sniff for bombs or sensors that measure abnormal levels of heat) and
are, hence, very lowly intrusive should be allowed. One may disagree
with this line of analysis but still accept the basic point that the less-
intrusive collection of insensitive information should be tolerated,
while the collection of highly sensitive information should be banned
under most circumstances.
Many court cases treat the voluntary release of information to
others (and by them to still others, discussed below under the third
party doctrine) as if the information disclosed-including phone
numbers dialed,44 copies of written checks,45 documents given to an
accountant,46 newspaper records,47 and even papers held by a
defendant's attorney48-all had the same level of sensitivity.49 A
43 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 20112 (Oct. 2012).
44 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
45 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
46 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
47 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
48 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
49 The preceding examples are laid out in Swire, supra note 2, at 908-09.
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privacy doctrine that follows the principles here outlined would grant
persons more say about the cybernization of sensitive information,
while recognizing that the less sensitive information may be used and
passed on without the individual's explicit consent.
Over the years, Congress has pieced together privacy law by
addressing the protection of one kind of sensitive information at a
time, rather than treating all kinds in a comprehensive fashion. Thus,
in 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare developed
the Code of Fair Information Practices to govern the collection and
use of information by the federal government. The principles of the
code were incorporated in the Privacy Act of 1974, which "prohibits
unauthorized disclosures of the records [the federal government]
protects. It also gives individuals the right to review records about
themselves, to find out if these records have been disclosed, and to
request corrections or amendments of these records, unless the
records are legally exempt."5o The Privacy Act applies only to the
federal government and has not been expanded to include records
kept by the private sector. In 1986, the ECPA restricted wiretapping,
regulated government access to electronic communication stored by
third parties, and prohibited the collection of communications content
(i.e., what was said, but not who was called) by pen registers. After the
Supreme Court ruled in the 1976 case United States v. Miller that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for records at financial
institutions, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act,51
which extended Fourth Amendment protections to these records. As
required by the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), in 2002 the Department of Health and Human Services
published the final form of "the Privacy Rule," which set the
"standards for the electronic exchange, privacy and security of health
information."52 This accumulation of privacy protections includes laws
covering specific sectors-or responding to specific events-but did
not provide an overarching design. A well-known case in point is
Congress' enactment of the Video Privacy Protection Act after the
50 Privacy and Internet, DIPLO,
http://textus.diplomacy.edu/portals/PrivacyAndlnternet/oview.asp?FilterTopic=/46434/
46464&ShowBlog=false (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
51 The Right to Financial PrivacyAct of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402 (2011).
52 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary (last visited Mar. 4,
2014).
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video rental records of Supreme Court nominee Judge Robert Bork
were obtained by a Washington, D.C. newspaper. 53
Congress could help to establish a privacy doctrine for the cyber
age by reviewing what by now has been fairly called an incomplete
"patchwork of federal laws and regulations" and providing a
comprehensive overall ranking of protections based on the sensitivity
of the data.54 However, many of the building blocks needed for such
an edifice are already in place. To develop sensitivity as a criteria for a
privacy doctrine does not require a major leap.
B. Volume
The second dimension on which a cyber age privacy doctrine
should draw is the volume of information collected. Volume refers to
the total amount of information collected about the same person
holding constant the level of sensitivity. Volume reflects the extent of
time surveillance is applied (the issue raised in Jones), the amount of
information collected at each point in time (e.g., only emails sent to a
specific person or all emails stored on a hard drive), and the
bandwidth of information collected at any one point in time (e.g., only
the addresses of email sent or also their content). A single piece of
low-sensitivity data deserves the least protection, and a high volume
of sensitive information should receive the most protection.
Under such a cyber age privacy doctrine, different surveillance and
search technologies differ in their intrusiveness. Least intrusive are
those that collect only discrete pieces of information of the least
sensitive kind. These include speed detection cameras, tollbooths, and
screening gates, because they all reveal, basically, one piece of
information of relatively low sensitivity. Radiation detectors, heat
reading devices and bomb and drug-sniffing dogs belong in this
category, not only because of the kind of information (i.e., low or not
sensitive) they collect, but also because the bandwidth of the
information they collect is very low (i.e., just one facet, indeed a very
narrow one, and for a short duration).
Typical closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs)-privately owned,
mounted on one's business, parking lot, or residential lobby-belong
in the middle range because they pick up several facets (e.g., location,
physical appearance, who one associates with), but do so for only a
brief period of time and in one locality. The opposite holds for
54 GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL
INFORMATION ONLINE (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ers/mise/R41756.pdf.
53 The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2013).
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Microsoft's Domain Awareness System, first tested in New York City
in 2012. The program collates thousands of pieces of information
about the same person from public sources-such as that from the
city's numerous CCTV cameras, arrest records, 911 calls, license plate
readers, and radiation detectors-and makes them easily and instantly
accessible to the police. While the system does not yet utilize facial
recognition, it could be readily expanded to include such technology.
Phone tapping-especially if not minimized and continued for
extended period of time-and computer searches, collect considerable
volume. (This should not be conflated with considerations that come
under the third dimension: Whether these facts are stored, collated,
analyzed and distributed i.e., the elements of cybernation). Drones are
particularly intrusive because they involve much greater bandwidth
and have the potential to engage in very prolonged surveillance at
relatively low costs compared to, say, a stake out. These volume
rankings must be adapted as technologies change. The extent to which
combining technologies is intrusive depends on the volume (duration
and bandwidth, holding sensitivity constant) of information collected.
High volume searches should be much more circumscribed than low
volume ones.
When the issue of extending privacy protection beyond spot
collection arose in Jones, several legal scholars, in particular Orin
Kerr, pointed to the difficulties of determining when the volume of
collection was reasonable and when it became excessively intrusive.
Kerr writes:
In Jones, the GPS device was installed for 28 days.
Justice Alito stated that this was 'surely' long enough to
create a mosaic. But he provided no reason why, and he
recognized that 'other cases may present more difficult
questions.' They may indeed. If 28 days is too far, how
about 21 days, or 14 days, or 3.6 days? Where is the
line?55
In response, one notes that there are many such cut off points in law,
such as the number of days suspects may be detained before they must
be charged or released, the voting and driving ages, the number of
jurors necessary for due process, and so on. One may say that they
reflect what a "reasonable" person would rule. Actually, they reflect
what judges consider a compromise between a restriction that is
clearly excessive and one that's clearly inadequate-a line that has
55 Kerr, supra note 6, at 333.
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been adjusted often. There is no reason the volume of collection
should not be similarly governed.
C. Cybernation: Storing, Analysis, and Access
The third dimension is the one that is increasing in importance
and regarding which law and legal theory have the most catching up to
do. To return to the opening deliberations of this article, historically,
much attention was paid to the question of whether the government
can legally collect certain kinds of information under specific
conditions. This was reasonable because most violations of privacy
occurred through search and surveillance that implicated this first-
level collection, that of spot information. True, some significant
violations also occurred in the paper age as a result of collating
information, storing it, analyzing it, and distributing it. However, to
reiterate, as long as records were paper bound, which practically all
were, these secondary violations of privacy were inherently limited
when compared to those enabled by the digitization of data and the
use of computers (i.e., by cybernation).
To illustrate the scope and effects of cybernation a comparison
follows: In one state, a car passes through a tollbooth, a picture of its
license plate (but not the driver or others on the front seat) is taken-
and then this information is immediately deleted from the computer if
the proper payment has been made. In another state, the same
information, augmented with a photo of the passengers, is
automatically transmitted to a central data bank. There, it is combined
with many thousands of other pieces of information about the same
person, from locations they have visited (e.g. based on cell tower
triangulation) to their magazine subscriptions and recent purchases
and so on. The information is regularly analyzed by artificial
intelligence systems to determine if people are engaged in any unusual
behavior, what places of worship they frequent (e.g. flagging
Mosques), which political events they attend (e.g. flagging those who
are who participated in protests), and if they stop at gun shows and so
on and on. The findings are widely distributed to local police and the
intelligence community and can be gained by the press and divorce
lawyers.
Both systems are based on the same spot information, that is,
pieces of information pertaining to a very limited, specific event or
point in time-as in the case in the first state. However, if such
information is combined with other information, analyzed, and
distributed, as depicted in the second scenario, it provides a very
comprehensive and revealing profile of one's personal life. In short,
the most serious violations of privacy are often perpetuated not by
surveillance or information collection per se, but by combination,
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manipulation, and data sharing-by cybernation. The more
information is cybernated, the more intrusive it becomes.
PART III. LIMITING INTRUSION BY CYBERNATION
There are in place two major systematic approaches to dealing
with privacy violations that result from secondary uses: The third
party doctrine and the EU Data Protection Directive (DPD). The third
party doctrine holds that once a person voluntarily discloses a fact to
another party, that party is free (unless explicitly banned) to pass on
(or sell) this information to third parties, and those various third
parties are free to further process this information, collate it with
other data, draw inferences, and so on-in short, to cybernate it.56
This approach is challenged by critics who note that in the cyber
age much of our private lives are lived in a cyber world operated by
third parties like Google and Facebook. Thus, Matthew Lawless
writes:
The third party doctrine gives effect to the criticism
often aimed at the 'reasonable expectation of privacy'
principle, by holding that individuals can only
reasonably expect privacy where the Court gives them
that privacy. Because the third party doctrine fails to
address true societal expectations of privacy (as evident
by its failure to protect any information entered into a
search engine), it reinforces the privacy norms of a
politically and temporally insulated judiciary: [O]nce
people know their searches are exposed, then-by the
time these cases are contested-there will, in truth, be
no expectation of privacy.57
However, even without drawing on whatever the societal
expectation of privacy is, one notes that considerable harm will come
to people and that core societal values will be violated if the third
56 Information voluntarily handed over to another party does not receive Fourth
Amendment protection "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Orin Kerr, The Case
for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561, 569-70 (2009). Earlier cases that
built up this doctrine include Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
57 Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the
Case for a "Crazy Quilt" of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007).
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party doctrine is given free rein. This observation is strengthened by
the fact that various exceptions to the third party doctrine are already
in place, such as special rules for medical and financial information.
However, according to Greg Nojeim, these rules do not provide the
same level of protection granted by the Fourth Amendment. He notes
that "privacy statutes that protect some categories of sensitive
personal information generally do not require warrants for law
enforcement access."58 Furthermore, Matthew Tokson argues that
"the conflation of disclosure to automated Internet systems with
disclosure to human beings" has led the court to exclude from Fourth
Amendment protection a great deal of personal information, including
"Internet protocol (IP) addresses, e-mail to/from information,
information about the volume of data transmitted to a user, name,
address, and credit card information, and even the contents of a user's
e-mails."59 In short, the third party doctrine provides very little
privacy protection and the less so the more cybernation is developed
and extended.
The European Union's DPD in effect takes the opposite view,
namely, that any secondary use of personal information released by a
person or collected about him requires the explicit a priori approval of
the original individual "owner" of the information, and that this
consent cannot be delegated to an agent or machine.60 The details of
DPD are complex and changing. 61 For instance, it made exceptions
from this rule for many areas, such as when the data is needed for the
purposes of research, public health, or law enforcement, among
others. In January 2012, the European Commission passed draft
legislation that would update the existing data protection law. This
legislation includes an "opt in" provision: "As a general rule, any
processing of personal data will require providing clear and simple
information to concerned individuals as well as obtaining specific and
58 Orin Kerr and Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party Records
Doctrine Be Revisited?, ABAJ. (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the-data question-should the third-
party-records doctrine be revisited.
59 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOwA L. REV. 581,586
(2011).
60 Daniel Cooper, Consent in EUData Protection Law, EUROPEAN PRIVACY ASSOCIATION,
http://www.europeanprivacyassociation.eu/public/download/EPA%2oEditorial_%2oCon
sent%2oin%2oEU%2oData%2oProtection%2oLaw.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
61 Why Do We Need an EUData Protection Reform?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1-en.pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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explicit consent by such individuals for the processing of their data."
Data show that information about a person is used many times each
day by a large variety of users. Hence, if such a policy were
systematically enforced, each Internet user would have to respond to
scores if not hundreds of requests per day even for uses of non-
sensitive information. It seems that in this area, as in many others, the
way DPD rules survive is by very often not enforcing them. Whenever
I meet Europeans, and following public lectures in the EU, I ask if
anyone has been ever asked to consent to the use of personal
information that they had previously released. I have found only one
person so far. He said that he got one such request-from Amazon.
Other sources indicate that compliance is at best "erratic."62 The
penalties for violating the DPD seem to be miniscule and rarely
collected. No wonder a large majority of the EU public-seventy
percent-fear that their personal data may be misused. 63 In short,
neither of these approaches is satisfactory.
In addition, there are in place a large number of laws, regulations,
and guidelines that deal with limited particular usages of personal
information beyond the collection point. However, a very large
number of them deal with only one dimension of the cube and often
with only one element of cybernation, limiting either storage, or
analysis, or distribution. The laws reflect the helter-skelter way they
were introduced and do not provide a systematic doctrine of cyber
privacy. They are best viewed as building blocks, which, if subjected to
considerable legal scholarship and legislation, could provide the
needed doctrine. They are like a score of characters in search of an
author.
One of the key principles for such a doctrine is that the legal
system can be more tolerant of the primary point spot collection of
personal information (a) the more limited the volume (duration and
bandwidth) of the collection 64 and (b) the more limited and regulated
62 Erica Newland, CDT Comments on EUData Protection Directive, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACYAND TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/erica-
newland/cdt-comments-eu-data-protection-directive.
63 Data Protection Reform: Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPA (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-12-41_en.htm?locale=fr.
64 In the wake of Jones, Professor Susan Freiwald identified four factors that the courts use
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to new surveillance technologies that "make
sense." These include whether the target is unaware of the surveillance; it covers items that
the people consider private; it is continuous; and it is indiscriminate (covers more
information than is necessary for establishing guilt). Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test,
THE SELECTED WORKS OF SUSAN FREIWALD (2013), available at
http://works.bepress.com/susan-freiwald/ii.
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cybernation is-holding constant the level of sensitivity of the
information. That is, much more latitude can be granted to the
collection and cybernation of insensitive information, stricter
limitations can be placed on highly sensitive information, and a
middle level of protection can be established in between.
In other words, a cyber age privacy doctrine can be much more
tolerant of primary collection conducted within a system of laws and
regulations that are effectively enforced to ensure that cybernation is
limited, properly supervised, and employed for legitimate purposes -
and much less so, if the opposite holds. One may refer to this rule as
the positive correlation between the level of permissiveness in primary
collection and the strictness of controls on secondary usage of
personal information.
Another key principle is a ban on using insensitive information to
divine the sensitive (e.g., using information about routine consumer
purchases to divine one's medical condition) because it is just as
intrusive as collecting and employing sensitive information. 65 This is
essential because currently such behavior is rather common. 66 Thus,
under the suggested law, Target would be prevented from sending
coupons for baby items to a teenage girl after the chain store's analysis
of her recent purchases suggest she might be pregnant. 67 And surely
Target would be prevented from selling this information to call
comers. To further advance the cyber age privacy doctrine, much more
65 People often trust assurances that their sensitive information (names and social security
number) can be deleted when their data is collected in large databases. In fact, scientists
have shown that individuals can be easily "deanonymized." Paul Ohm writes that this
misunderstanding has given the public a false sense of security and has lead to inadequate
privacy protections, laws and regulations. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure ofAnonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). See
also Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, Bus. WK. (Apr. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.businessweek.Com/2ooo/oo_14/b3675027.htm; Jennifer Golbeck, Christina
Robles & Karen Turner, Predicting Personality with Social Media, CHI EXTENDED
ABSTRACTS 2011, 253-262.
66 Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage and Counterespionage
in the Internet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 94 (2003) (evaluating ways to resist discriminatory
marketing in cyberspace); Stepanek, supra note 65 ([a] data broker company Acxiom
matches names against housing, education, and incomes in order to identify the
unpublicized ethnicity of an individual or group); Nicholas Carr, Tracking Is an Assault on
Liberty, With Real Dangers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/artiles/SBI000142405274870374890457541168271438988
8 ("[i]t used to be ... you had to get a warrant to monitor a person or a group of people.
Today, it is increasingly easy to monitor ideas"); Etzioni, supra note 1, at 948-50.
67 How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-
target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did.
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attention needs to be paid to private actors. Privacy rights, like others,
are basically held against the government, to protect people from
undue intrusion by public authorities. However, increasingly
cybernation is carried out by the private sector. There are corporations
that make shadowing Internet users-and keeping very detailed
dossiers on them-their main line of business. According to Slobogin:
Companies like Acxiom, Docussearch, ChoicePoint,
and Oracle can provide the inquirer with a wide array
of data about any of us, including: Basic demographic
information, income, net worth, real property holdings,
social security number, current and previous addresses,
phone numbers and fax numbers, names of neighbors,
driver records, license plate and VIN numbers,
bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment, business
and criminal records, bank account balances and
activity, stock purchases, and credit card activity.68
And these data are routinely made available to the government,
including the FBI. Unless this private cybernation is covered, the
cyber age privacy doctrine will be woefully incomplete. 69
Given that private actors are very actively engaged in cybernation
and often tailor their work so that it might be used by the government
(even if no contract is in place and they are, hence, not subject to the
limits imposed on the government), extending the privacy doctrine
beyond the public/private divide is of pivotal importance for the
future of privacy in the cyber age. Admittedly, applying to the private
sector similar restrictions and regulations that control the government
may well be politically unfeasible in the current environment.
However, as one who analyzes the conditions of society from a
normative viewpoint, I am duty bound to point out that it makes ever
less sense to maintain this distinction.7o Privacy will be increasingly
lost in the cyber age, with little or no gain to the common good, unless
private actors-and not just the government-are more reined in. To
what extent this may be achieved by self-regulation, changes in
norms, increased transparency, or government regulation is a
question not here addressed.
68 Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REv. 317, 320 (2008).
69 For further discussion on these matters see Etzioni, supra note i; Etzioni, supra note 24
(discussing the collapse of the public-private divide).
70 For more discussion see Etzioni, supra note 24.
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For this doctrine to be further developed, laws and court rulings
ought to be three-dimensional.71 These laws and court cases had best
specify not only whether a particular collection of personal
information is a "search," but also what level of sensitivity can be
tolerated and to what extent the information may be stored, analyzed,
and distributed. This may seem-and is-a tall, if not impossible,
order. However, as is next illustrated, a considerable number of
measures are already in place that are, in effect, at least two-
dimensional. These, though, suffer from the fact that they have been
introduced each on their own and do not reflect an overarching
doctrine of privacy; hence, they reveal great inconsistencies that need
to be remedied. I cannot stress enough that the following are but
selective examples of such measures.
One should note that a very early attempt to deal with the issue-
basically, in terms here used, by banning a form of cybernation-
utterly failed. In 2003, Congress shut down the Pentagon's Total
Information Awareness (TIA) program, which was created to detect
potential terrorists by using data mining technologies to analyze
unprecedented amounts of personal transaction data. However, a
report by the Wall Street Journal in 2oo8 revealed that the most
important components of TIA were simply "shifted to the NSA" and
"put in the so-called black budget, where it would receive less scrutiny
and bolster other data-sifting efforts. "72
Minimization is one way of addressing the volume issue, as Swire
pointed out in his groundbreaking article on Jones and the mosaic
theory.73 Accordingly, when the FBI taps a phone, even for an
extended period of time, the intrusion can be reduced significantly if
the FBI either stops listening when it hears that the conversation is
not relevant to the investigation (e.g., a child is calling the suspect
under surveillance) or locks away those segments of the taped
correspondence that turn out to be irrelevant.74 For this rule to be
71 Kerr sees a greater role here for Congress, while Swire sees a greater role for the courts.
See Swire, supra note 2, at 912; Kerr, supra note ii. This article is unable to add to these
deliberations other than to recognize that both are needed and neither seems able to keep
up with changing technologies.
72 Siobhan Gorman, NSA 's Domestic Spying Grows As Agency Sweeps Up Data, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 10, 2OO8, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/artiles/SB12o511973377523845.
73 Peter P. Swire, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking
Case, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 57 (2012).
74 Gary T. Marx, Ethics for the New Surveillance, 14 INFO. SOC'Y: AN INT'L J. 171,178
(1998).
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integrated into the doctrine, it may be waived for insensitive
information. That is, there would be no need to minimize if the child
asked, say, to watch TV, but activated if she asked, say, about medical
news concerning a family member.
Another example of a safeguard against excessive privacy
intrusions is the requirement that certain content be deleted after a
specific time period. Most private companies that utilize CCTV erase
video footage after a set number of days, such as after a week.
Admittedly, their reasons for doing so may be simply economic;
however, the effect is still to limit the volume of collection and
potential for subsequent abuse. Note that that there are no legal
requirements to erase these tapes. However, such laws ought to be
considered (Europeans are increasingly recognizing a "right to be
forgotten"). It would be in the public interest to require that footage
be kept for a fixed period of time (as it has proven useful in fighting
crime and terrorism), but also ban under most circumstances the
integration of the video feed into encompassing and cybernated
systems of the kind Microsoft has developed.
The treatment of private local CCTVs should be examined in the
context of the ways other such spot collection information is treated.
Because the bandwidth of information collected by toll booths, speed
cameras and radiation detectors is very narrow, one might be
permitted to store it longer and feed it into cybernated systems. By
contrast, cell phone tracking can be utilized to collect a great volume
and bandwidth of information about a person's location and activities.
People carry their phones to many places they cannot take their cars,
where no video cameras or radiation detectors will be found, including
sensitive places such as political meetings, houses of worship, and
residences. These rules must be constantly updated as what various
technologies can observe and retain constantly changes.
Regulations to keep information paper bound have been
introduced for reasons other than protecting privacy, but these
requirements still have the effect of limiting intrusiveness. For
example, Congress prevents the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) from computerizing gun records when such
information is collected during background checks.75 In 2013, an
amendment to the anti-insider trading STOCK Act exempted 28,ooo
executive branch staff from having to post their financial disclosure
75 Erica Goode and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Curbs Said to Hamper A.T.F. in Gun
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.Com/2012/12/26/us/egislative-handcuffs-limit- atfs- ability-to- fight-
gun-crime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o.
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forms "online in a searchable, sortable and downloadable format."76
These bans remind one that not all the privacy measures that are in
place are legitimate and that some are best scaled back rather than
enhanced.77
A related issue is raised by the cybernation of arrest records.
Arrest records should be but are not considered highly-sensitive
information. When these records, especially those concerning people
who were subsequently released without any charges, were paper
bound, the damage they inflicted on most people's reputations was
limited. However, as a result of cybernation, they have become much
more problematic. Under the suggested doctrine, arrest records of
people not charged after a given period of time would be available only
to law enforcement officers. The opposite might be said about data
banks that alert the public to physicians that have been denied
privileges for cause, a very high threshold that indicates serious
ethical shortcomings.
Many computer systems ("clouds" included) encrypt their data
and a few have introduced audit trails. The cyber age privacy doctrine
might require that all data banks that contain sensitive information be
encrypted and include at least some rudimentary form of an audit
trail.
Technologies can be recalibrated to collect the "need to know"
information while shielding extraneous but highly sensitive
information from observation. For example, when law enforcement
collects DNA samples from convicted criminals or arrested
individuals, FBI analysts create DNA profiles using so-called 'junk
DNA" "because it is not 'associated with any known physical or
medical characteristics,' and thus theoretically poses only a minimal
invasion of privacy."78 Storing these "genetic fingerprints" in national
databases is much less intrusive than retaining data produced by
blood samples, which "reveal sensitive medical or biological
information."79 In 2013, the TSA stopped its use of body scanners that
revealed almost-nude images, using instead scanners that produce
"cartoon-like" images on which the scanners mark places hidden
76 Tamara Keith, How Congress Quietly Overhauled Its Insider-Trading Law, NPR (Apr.
16, 2013), http://m.npr.org/news/Polities/177496734.
77 Etzioni, supra note 38.
78 ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40077, COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 2 (2010) (quoting United States v. Kineade, 379 F.3d 813,
8M8 ( 9 th Cir. 2004) (en bane)).
79 Id. at 13.
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objects are founds ° This did not affect the volume of collection, but
lessened the sensitivity of the content.
Other measures must address the fact that often data can be "re-
identified" or "de-anonymized." In 2oo6, AOL released the search
records-stripped of "personal identifiers"-of over 6oo,ooo people.
An investigation by the New York Times, however, demonstrated that
intimate information-including names and faces-could be gleaned
from such purportedly anonymous data. This risk is mitigated by the
development of statistical methods that prevent such undertakings,
such as "differential privacy," which allows curators of large databases
to release the results of socially beneficial data analysis without
compromising the privacy of the respondents who make up the
samples1
Many more examples could be provided. However, the above list
may suffice to show that, while there are numerous measures in place
that deal with various elements of the privacy cube, these have not
been introduced with systematic attention to the guiding principles
needed for the cyber age.
80 Jack Nicas, TSA to Halt Revealing Body Scans at Airports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2013)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB000142412788732378370457825152613273568.
81 Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results, TAMC LNCS 4978, 1-19
(2008) available at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~franklin/ecs289/2oo/dwork 2oo8.pdf
([r]oughly speaking, differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a single
database item does not [substantially] affect the outcome of any analysis. It follows that no
risk is incurred by joining the database, providing a mathematically rigorous means of
coping with the fact that distributional information may be disclosive").
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